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Zionism and the 
Nationalization of Jerusalem
Khaldoun Samman
We should practice so that we can see Muslims as Hindus and 
Hindus as Muslims. We should practice so that we can see Israe-
lis as Palestinians and Palestinians as Israelis. We should practice 
until we can see that each person is us, that we are not separate 
from others. This will greatly reduce our suffering. We are what 
we perceive. This is the teaching…of interbeing.
Thich Nhat Hanh
Over the years, I have given many public talks on the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. After discussing the formation of apartheid in Israel 
and its unethical nature, I have at times received responses implying 
that I hate the “Jewish people.” I have all too often witnessed occasions 
in which some pro-Israeli supporters quickly label you as an anti-Sem-
ite at the slightest hint of language that speaks critically of Israel, as if 
such language is a condemnation of all Jews. Similarly, this equating 
of Zionism with the “Jewish people” has lately seeped into Palestinian 
and Arab discourse, which is surprising given the fact that traditionally 
activists have consciously attempted to disentangle the two concepts. 
Some Palestinians may even think that you are a traitor if you show up 
in Arab East Jerusalem with a Jewish friend wearing a yarmulka, as I 
noticed on one occasion during my last visit to the region. Indeed, this 
defensive “knee-jerk” reaction of identifying criticism of state policy 
as an attack on your own identity has become the rule rather than the 
exception when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When I pro-
test this form of what we could call a “culturalized” or an identitarian 
politics, the response is usually a blank stare, as though my criticism 
is impractical and naïve. “Isn’t it self-evident,” many ask me, “that the 
issue is between two peoples?” My response is an unequivocal, “No, it 
is not so!”
My claim throughout this article is that what appears self-evident 
and commonsensical is only so because our language has been handed 
over to the least politically creative class of nationalists who think 
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and act upon the world in a strictly Manichaean or binary manner. Of 
course, this is not limited only to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, as the 
same can be said for people in many different contexts. In the United 
States, for instance, a destructive cell of right-wing political elites have 
taken over our language to such an extent that it is not unusual now 
for a left-leaning person to see American politics strictly through the 
lens of blue versus red states, defining all Evangelical Christians as 
hopelessly lost to right-wing politics. Such a person is thus unable to 
understand why, for reasons not so self-evident as they may appear, 
a particular sector of poor and middle class whites may be attracted 
to a George Wallace, Ronald Reagan or, God forbid, Jerry Falwell.1 
Similarly, in today’s Turkey, the problematic binary between secularists 
and Islamists has created a political climate in which a Turkish Che-
Guevara-tee-shirt-wearing leftist could never see himself in alliance 
with a Turk who attends Mosque prayers on a regular basis. It is as 
though our choice to carry the Qur’an or Bible, refuse a glass of wine 
on behalf of religious observance, or wear the yarmulka or the veil 
naturally anchors us to a certain politics. What many on the left tend to 
forget is that if they look just a few decades back at their own history, 
many of those Bible and Qur’an carrying folks were actually central 
players in redistributive politics, and only recently have they been 
articulated into a neo-liberal project. By fixing our political maneuvers 
into a simplified representation of these groups as being naturally 
reactionary, many of us are now unable to understand the complexity 
of these people and the infinite possibilities they possess for articulat-
ing all kinds of political identities, for good or for bad ends. By not 
understanding this complexity, we have forfeited the public sphere to 
right-wing nationalists who know all too well how to articulate popu-
list rhetoric for a destructive politics that produces ultra-chauvinistic 
forms of nationalism.
When did words and labels become so fixed in politics? It happened 
when we allowed the powerful—those who hold government posi-
tions, run our media, write our novels, run our progressive politics, 
set-up our museums and our theme parks, or write our histories—to 
gain free reign to represent the world as though it were a museum and 
a collection of artifacts with easily recognizable labels: Eskimo, Aborig-
ine, Neolithic, Chinese, Arab, Jew. In other words, it has occurred 
whenever we have handed over our language to those who define 
politics as a field of self-evident representations.
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This has especially been the case when it comes to the Palestin-
ian-Israeli conflict in which Zionists, Arab Nationalists, and Islamists 
have attempted to completely “culturalize” political identities. It is 
so deeply rooted that even many of our distinguished sociologists, 
political scientists, anthropologists, novelists, historians, film produc-
ers—in short, all those who are credited with possessing the most 
open-minded orientations in the world—now also frame the issue as 
though it were simply between two collectives, Jews on one side and 
Arabs/Palestinians on the other. Take, for instance, Benny Morris, one 
of the most highly acclaimed Israeli historians, who is credited with 
beginning a new school of thought concerning the Israeli-Palestinian 
issue and is considered one of the founders of what has come to be 
known as Postzionism. In an interview with a Haaretz reporter, Morris 
makes the following markedly racist assumption that demonstrates 
clearly the political impulses and leanings of one historian frequently 
cited about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict:
There is a deep problem in Islam. It’s a world whose values are differ-
ent. A world in which human life doesn’t have the same value as it does 
in the West, in which freedom, democracy, openness and creativity are 
alien. A world that makes those who are not part of the camp of Islam 
fair game. Revenge is also important here. Revenge plays a central part 
in the Arab tribal culture. Therefore, the people we are fighting and the 
society that sends them have no moral inhibitions. If it obtains chemi-
cal or biological or atomic weapons, it will use them. If it is able, it will 
also commit genocide…Something like a cage has to be built for them. I 
know that sounds terrible. It is really cruel. But there is no choice. There 
is a wild animal there that has to be locked up in one way or another.2
Benny Morris is utilizing the very same language colonizers have 
been using against the colonized since the inception of Social Darwin-
ism and the view that the “savages” of the Global South, being close to 
beast-like in nature, need to be tamed by a superior race (hence, “a cage 
has to be built”). Notice here how Benny Morris is using the language 
of “us” and “them,” with “it” (Islam and Palestinians) as a group of 
barbarians who are culturally and religiously dysfunctional, somehow 
genetically prone to violence, and out to get “us” democracy-loving 
folks, as though issues such as occupation, the violent destruction of 
Palestinian villages by the Israeli regime, and the constant political 
and economic squeeze Palestinians face daily have nothing to do with 
“revenge.” Also, if we are to accept Morris’s insistence that religion is 
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the cause of violence, which I do not, then one has to be fair and claim 
that Judaism is therefore much more violent, given that “Jews” have 
killed 1,050 Palestinian children as compared with the 123 Israeli chil-
dren killed by Palestinians since September of 2000—nearly eight and 
a half times more deaths!3 If it sounds pathetic to claim that Judaism or 
Jewish culture is to blame for these numbers, which clearly is absurd, 
then Benny Morris’s racist understanding of the conflict should like-
wise be considered problematic. At times it seems as though educa-
tion affords some of us the luxury of using the same binary language, 
except in a more convincing, sophisticated, and polite way. It just takes 
a little jab by a reporter to show the political nature of some of our 
highly prized writers.
In any case, if we turn back the clock to look at history from a 
vantage point prior to the establishment of the state of Israel, we will 
notice that many Jews and Arabs did not view each other as diametri-
cally opposed groups that are culturally distinct and in need of sepa-
rate homelands. Then Zionism entered into Palestine with its highly 
racialized nationalist project. In other words, there had to be a political 
intervention by Manichaean-type nationalists in order to create this 
view of the world. Indeed, American Jewry itself was highly resistant 
to Zionism until 1967, when the Zionists started to push American 
Jews to equate their identities with the state of Israel.
It is this form of identitarian politics that we must challenge collec-
tively. Accepting a culturalized and binary understanding of the con-
flict is an irresponsible act that hands over our language to right-wing 
movements whose aim is to create fear and destruction between Jews 
and Arabs. These movements can only survive with our own complic-
ity in using their language of “Jew” and “Arab.”
In this essay, I will be unable to demonstrate all of the issues pre-
sented above. Instead, I will choose a more selective path and show 
how Zionism, as a Jewish nationalist movement, has squeezed our 
language to the point that all we can see now are “Jews” and “Arabs.” I 
could, of course, do the same for Palestinian nationalists and Islamists 
as well, but my intuition tells me that most of the readers of this essay 
need a serious treatise on how to deconstruct the language of the most 
powerful narrators of the original “Jew versus Arab” myth, which 
suggests that Arab and Jew are inherently of two radically different 
material compounds that can never be combined. Indeed, this reduc-
tionist, culturalized form of political identities is, in my view, the single 
greatest obstacle to the creation of a more pluralistic and sustainable 
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One-State solution. The idea of a “Jewish state” or a “Palestinian state” 
is actually a product of our modern racist way of thinking about our 
world, in which the actual multitudinous nature of social life is negated 
by a closed and intolerant mind. With each visit to Israel/Palestine, I 
am saddened by Israel’s destructive policy of bulldozing over a history 
of deep diversity. Whatever you may call it—ethnic cleansing, apart-
heid, Bantustans—it is a sad testimony to a land that could have been a 
light to all nations but instead has become darkness.
The focus of this essay will be a narration of how this darkness over-
took the area and transformed its diverse and rich past into its present 
shallow state of identity politics, ruled by men who know only the 
language of vulgarity. I will do this through the suggestive case study 
of Jerusalem, particularly demonstrating the way in which Zionist dis-
course and policy has fundamentally transformed facts on the ground 
so as to erase all Others. Time calls upon us to step back and see how 
“Jews” and “Arabs,” all in one sweeping century, were transformed 
from a symbiotic world of unfixed identities into one completely swal-
lowed-up by the Manichaean Zionist movement’s efforts to turn Israel 
into a “Jewish homeland,” while placing all others as “impurities” in 
its midst.
*****
They’re going to build the wall through my neighborhood.
My family and I, we are going to be on the wrong side of the wall.
I am in shock. I don’t know what to do.4
The Palestinian author, Sami Hadawi, in his book Bitter Harvest: A 
Modern History of Palestine, tells of his childhood in Jerusalem before 
the coming of World War I, and the Balfour Declaration’s proposal for 
a Jewish “home” in Palestine. His recollections reveal much about how 
radically Arab-Jewish relations have changed in such a short period of 
time. He remembers, for example, how children eagerly anticipated 
the springtime festivities in which “Moslem, Christian and Jew alike 
took part in the Moslem pilgrimage to the tomb of the prophet Moses.” 
During the summer, he recalls, they all “flocked to the Valley to take 
part in the Jewish celebrations at the tomb of Sadik Shameon.” During 
other parts of the year, members of the three faiths “picnicked in the 
gardens around the tomb of the Holy Virgin Mary, near Gethsemane, 
where the Christian community spent a day and a night rejoicing.” 
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Savoring such memories, Hadawi concludes: “Ours was indeed a Holy 
City, a city of peace, love and brotherhood, where the stranger could 
find shelter, the pilgrim loving care and the faithful salvation.”5
Yet, by the time Hadawi had entered his youth, a change was 
already brewing in Palestine. At the turn of the 20th century, a young 
movement on the nationalist scene, Zionism, had begun to focus upon 
Palestine as a place ripe for the creation of a Jewish state. Recogniz-
ing that the land was predominantly populated by Arabs, the Zionists 
began to articulate an objective of replacing its indigenous non-Jew-
ish population with a Jewish one, specifically showing preference for 
European Jewry. Relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine began 
to erode. Indeed, in Jaffa, for example, despite the fact that local elites 
from each community formed close personal bonds in many instances, 
Jewish sources reported a fear in the Arab population that “the Jews 
came to impose a foreign Government upon [them].”6 In 1905, Negib 
Azouri, an Arab journalist writing in Paris, had already predicted in 
a pamphlet the coming of a conflict between Jews and Arabs. Azouri 
called attention to an emerging effort by Jews “to reconstitute [them-
selves] on a very large scale the ancient kingdom of Israel,” and he 
forecasted that such a movement would trigger the “awakening of the 
Arab nation.” Further, he concluded that the confrontation between 
the two movements was a continuous function of destiny that could 
have implications for the entire world.7
Such reports would transform notions of “Arab” and “Jew” as sepa-
rate peoples, posing the two “in a kind of permanent, irreconcilable 
opposition to each other, representing two entirely different cultures, 
ways of life, temperaments, mentalities, sets of values, and aspira-
tions.”8 As Zionists proposed and generated exclusively Jewish settle-
ments throughout Palestine, a nationalized mentality began to take 
clear form, in which “Jews would no longer want to live among Arabs, 
even in ‘nice’ neighborhoods.”9 Today such nationalist views have 
crystallized to the point that some Israelis even assert the impossibil-
ity of a loyal citizenry of Arabs residing in Israel. This view extends to 
essentialist notions that Arabs form a separate nationality that would 
be better served if they were “somehow able to find their way out of 
the country and settle in neighboring Arab states ‘among their own 
people and in the midst of their Arab brethren.’ ”10 In fact, such a posi-
tion is not novel to the current state of affairs. Many of Israel’s founding 
fathers, including the nation’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, 
went so far as to argue that since Arab Palestinians “did not constitute 
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a distinct, separate nation, and were not an integral part of the coun-
try,” they should be expelled from Israel and “transferred to other 
Arab countries.”11
Many critics of Israel blame this change in social relations on the 
demographic transformation of Palestine. They emphasize, for instance, 
that at the time of Hadawi’s childhood years, immediately preceding 
the very large expansion of Jewish immigration into Palestine under 
British control, the population of Jews was fewer than 10% of the total 
Palestinian population, comprising 56,000 Jews as compared to 600,000 
Arabs.12 These numbers would be radically altered with the Zionist 
movement, verging upon the realization of a Jewish state. It would 
provoke some 750,000 to 1 million Arab Palestinians, in fear of Jewish 
attacks on their villages, to abandon their homes in 1948, only to be 
denied the right of return by the new Israeli government. Many such 
families remain scattered even today in refugee camps throughout the 
occupied territories and other regions of the Middle East.13
While such numerical details obviously contribute to an understand-
ing of the eventual conflict that would emerge, a deeper explanation 
lies in the manner by which Zionists distinguished Jews from Arabs, 
not only in nationalist terms, but along racial lines as well. Leading 
Zionists rejected the idea of sharing Palestine for the long term with its 
native population, embracing instead notions of transforming it into a 
“mono-religious” Jewish state. “Its success,” as Edward Said argues, 
“required it to be as intent on the destruction of the indigenous Arab 
society as it was on the construction of a Jewish life in Palestine.”14 
Consequently, from its inception the Zionist movement followed an 
agenda of complete segregation, created a “dual society,” with an eco-
nomic development policy devised to construct territorial partition 
and an employment program designed to refuse Palestinians jobs and 
create exclusively Jewish kibbutzim.15 As Theodor Herzl, the founding 
father of Zionism, proclaimed:
We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by 
procuring employment for it in the transit countries while denying it 
employment in our own country… . Both the process of expropriation 
and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circum-
spectly.16
The combination of demographic change with novel racialized and 
nationalized representations of peoplehood served to provide quite 
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sufficient fuel for an inevitable and dramatic shift in social relations 
between Jews and Arabs. Zionist terminology would further fan the 
flames as the movement enacted a “Judaization” project, while simul-
taneously “de-Arabizing” the land. Such language would concretize 
Arab otherness in the popular Jewish imagination, posing the Jews as a 
superior, more developed race that performed its duty by conquering, 
developing, and modernizing a Palestine that Arabs had neglected. In 
creating such a discourse, Zionism introduced a new notion of people-
hood into traditional Palestine, through which a border could be seen 
as a natural result of difference, hiding intentions to “negate the iden-
tity of those on the other side.”17 As John Rose has recently argued, this 
is how Zionism introduced a divide between Arabs and Jews that was 
contrary to the imperial Islamic Arab legacy.18
In order to appreciate the gravity of such change, particularly in 
light of “time-immemorialist” scholarship, which posits the incompat-
ibility of Jewish and Arab culture, it is important to emphasize that 
before the late 19th century, with few exceptions, the inhabitants of 
traditional Palestine, especially its Muslim, Christian, and Jewish com-
munities, not only intermingled in the streets, but lived, played, and 
prayed in a neighborly fashion far more closely than can be imagined 
today.19 In no place was this more evident than in Jerusalem, where, as 
S.D. Goiten notes, homes and other residential compounds were often 
shared to the extent that Muslims and Jews occupied different rooms 
under the same roof.20
Current formations of identity permit such familiarities precious 
little room. Even contemporary temples of knowledge house library 
stacks that are shelved in different sections, according to Jewish or 
Arab affiliation, “studied by different scholars, and are taught by dif-
ferent departments even though in some cases they come from the 
same place and time.”21 Indeed, in complete contradiction to modern 
notions of progress that champion tolerance, exchange, and inclusive 
societies, the nearer to the present the lens is focused, the sharper the 
view of exclusivity becomes. As if obsessed with a newfound skill, 
nations are more efficient than ever at policing their borders, always 
choosing to reinforce them at any sign of tension or breach. In Israel, 
this has translated into an ever-maturing metaphorical image of Jews 
and Arabs as two chemical compounds that may combust if mixed 
together. This insistence upon separateness that has engulfed Jew and 
Arab alike has served to implicitly suggest a sense of ideological, social, 
and political volatility.22
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Thus, turning to the post-WWI period, after three decades of British 
colonial rule followed by the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, not 
only has a demographic distortion of Palestine and the city of Jerusa-
lem emerged, but so has a completely new understanding of religion, 
ethnicity, and nationality. If thirteen centuries of Muslim/Arab rule, 
with its complex, yet relatively effective system of inter-communal 
relations, existed prior to modern times, “the present campaign by 
Israel and the Zionist movement,” as Naseer Aruri observes, “is geared 
towards a Jewish ascendancy and an erosion of Christian and Muslim 
influence.”23
These changes are clearly visible when journeying through the 
region between Jordan, the Occupied Territories, and Israel, where one 
must travel through many checkpoints, exclusively Jewish settlements, 
and highways. Lacking proper papers and a correctly colored license 
plate, crossing from the Jordanian border into Jerusalem may take lon-
ger than would a similar journey during the time of the first-century 
CE Apostle Paul. For a Palestinian, the journey is virtually impossible. 
G.W. Bowersock, a historian of the Middle East, captures this well:
I have made the journey from the old Roman city of Philadelphia, which 
is the modern Jordanian capital of Amman, across the new Allenby 
Bridge to Jerusalem, but only with my papers in good order. There is no 
more instructive experience for a student of the Middle East…than this 
journey… . For an ancient historian each barrier is a constant reminder 
that there was nothing comparable in former times.24
Those who posit an inherent conflict between Jews and Arabs rooted 
in ancient claims would be well served to compare the recent experi-
ence with the Muslim/Arab period, during which indigenous Jews and 
Christians were, with rare exception, accorded sufficient privileges 
with which to flourish as an essential element within a large inter-
national body, despite having been placed in rank below Muslims.25 
Indeed, as Mark Cohen adds, “the Jewish and Christian dhimmis occu-
pied a recognized, fixed, safeguarded niche within the hierarchy of the 
Islamic social order.”26
The ghetto-like existence under which most Palestinians live today 
in both the Occupied Territories and Israel proper reveals just how 
utterly bankrupt the present circumstances have become. In his analy-
sis of the Islamic period, Cohen further observes that, “the topography 
of residence in a Muslim town lent the Jew an aura of inclusion, of 
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normalcy” to the extent that “in most cities of the Islamic Mediterra-
nean…Jewish quarters, in the sense of exclusive Jewish districts, hardly 
existed.”27 Such a description is in sharp contrast with the present 
period in which Jewish settlements have created a Swiss-cheese-like 
topography of Palestine, enclosing Arab inhabitants into Bantustans 
and ghettos. In the words of S.D. Goiten, most Jews under Muslim/
Arab rule “lived in their towns in noncontiguous clusters, such that 
‘there were many neighborhoods predominantly Jewish, but hardly 
any that were exclusively so.’ ”28 Indeed, moving forward in time, it 
would appear that at least in Palestine under the nationalist rubric, 
severe regression has occurred, rather than progress (despite the com-
mon modern mythology).
Further examining the comparison, Moses Maimonides, a Jew liv-
ing in 12th-century Cordoba under Muslim-ruled Spain, exemplifies 
successful integration, while fully retaining cultural and religious 
roots. As Leon Roth explains, Maimonides did not entertain “the con-
ception [that]…Judaism for him is…a product of ‘race’ or an inheri-
tance of ‘blood,’ nor is it bound up exclusively with any one people 
or any one soil.”29 Living within an imperial context that allowed for 
relatively healthy relationships between Jews and Christians and their 
Arab Muslim neighbors naturally influenced his views.30 Through-
out his life, as he spoke and wrote in Arabic, dressed and behaved in 
Arabic fashion, and developed styles, patterns of thought, and world-
views that were Arab in flavor, Maimonides appreciated his existence 
as an Arab, while never once questioning his Jewish identity. The mere 
notion of friction and discontinuity between these two aspects of his 
identity seems never to have entered his thinking, to the extent that 
even the conception of his Arab surroundings as a contaminant would 
have been inconceivable.
Maimonides does not represent an isolated example, but rather the 
general state of affairs, at least in the fruitful Middle Ages of Islamic 
rule, if not throughout its entirety, with few exceptions. The manner, 
therefore, in which Zionists in the contemporary world would come 
to identify a notion of “influences” as the source of racial and national 
contamination requires further inquiry. Many of those who have sub-
scribed to Zionist views have often used such language in fear that 
allowing Palestinian refugees to return would “undermine the Jewish 
state,” or they would dread the mention of the one-state solution that 
would invite a radical shift in demography, in which Arabs and Jews 
would live as equal citizens. The policies pursued as a result of such 
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language have been, by any standard, racist in flavor, and are only 
upheld due to the lack of public concern in both Israel and the United 
States, to which the latter continues to provide a green light.
The Zionist movement developed its objective of transferring a 
largely Arab-owned land into Jewish possession in the late 19th cen-
tury. By 1917, under the tutelage of imperial Britain, it began to imple-
ment such goals and would work extensively toward revising Arab 
notions of Jewish status under the Muslim social order.31 As Charles 
Smith argues:
Zionists and Zionist claims changed completely the traditional Muslim 
conception of Jews as occupying dhimmi status, protected by, but sub-
ordinate to, Muslims… . Zionism, as a European movement, came to be 
seen initially as another attempt by Western imperialism to subordinate 
Muslims to Europeans, and became even more threatening once it was 
realized that the Zionists wished to take part of what had been Arab 
lands for centuries and remake it into a Jewish homeland. Arab opposi-
tion emerged before World War I in response to Zionist immigration and 
land purchases…32
Such recent political realities—as opposed to claims of ancient and 
predestined quarrels that are almost genetic in character—provide 
a clear context for understanding the origins of the current conflict 
between Jews and Arabs. Even with the final demise of the Ottoman 
Empire at the end of World War I, the sense of “communal solidar-
ity” that had predominantly characterized relations between Jews and 
Arabs continued to exist under the British Mandate period, albeit sub-
ject to French and British manipulation and influence along sectarian 
lines.33 Indeed, the status of the millet system that had existed in the 
19th century under the Ottoman Empire, which protected Christian 
and Jewish minorities, was quickly being undermined by the early 
20th century, under the influence of Britain and the Zionist movement. 
As Europe had recently risen in power and had incorporated the Mid-
dle East into a Eurocentric modern global system, the old confessional 
structure of the millet had given way to a new system of special privi-
leges for Christians. Such privileges would come to extend to Jews as 
well.
The increase in hostilities that began to emerge between Palestin-
ians and Jews, as between Christians and Muslims in other parts of 
the Middle East, thus embodied an immediate response to changes 
that were occurring in the material and ideological realm of modern 
Macalester International  Vol. 23
232
Palestine, quite in contrast to biased and racialized characterizations 
that describe Arabs and Muslims as having an inherent cultural and 
religious incapacity to adjust to modernity. Typifying such a view, 
many orientalists have long produced studies of the “Orient” from the 
perspective of otherness, presuming that some cultural and religious 
essence or worldview has been the cause of regional hostilities and of 
failure to adjust to the tolerant and pluralistic standards of the modern 
West.
Further examining the collusion between Britain and Zionists, it is 
worthwhile to note that Zionist Jews were active in the military admin-
istration of the British colony in Palestine throughout the entire period 
of the British Mandate, to the extent that an exclusively Jewish mili-
tary force existed. Zionist Jewish experts were also important members 
of the British colonial land authority. Such realities help to portray 
the precise manner in which European intervention in Palestine 
strengthened the position of Zionist settlers at the expense of native 
Palestinians.34
Economically, Britain facilitated Jewish land acquisition and pro-
vided for Jewish enterprises in a clearly recognizable protection-
ist policy of preferential tariffs that included the free importation of 
raw materials already produced in Palestine. Native Palestinians, by 
contrast, were treated as just another colonized nation and naturally 
resented such policy as a double standard. As British authority sup-
ported Jewish industry while simultaneously weakening the Palestin-
ian economic sector, it created in the process a dual economy with a 
discriminatory labor policy that introduced separate wage systems. 
This further alienated the indigenous population and encouraged the 
emergence of an exclusively Jewish industrial sector fully independent 
of the Palestinian Arab population and its economy.35 Furthermore, as 
the British worked to weaken Palestinian resistance to their occupation, 
Jewish settlers benefited economically and politically. They continued 
to form massive and exclusive Jewish settlements on once Palestinian 
lands, while the British did the dirty work of actively subduing an 
indigenous Palestinian anti-colonial and anti-Zionist movement.36
Michel Warschawski, an Israeli activist, argues in his book, On the 
Border, “it is a great historical irony that Zionism, which wanted to tear 
down the walls of the ghettoes, has created the biggest ghetto in Jew-
ish history, a super-armed ghetto, capable of continually expanding 
its confines, but a ghetto nonetheless, turned inward upon itself.”37 In 
producing these ghettoes, Jewish settlements today are placed stra-
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tegically around largely Arab villages with the intent of fragmenting 
territorial access and blocking physical expansion.38 The goal has been 
clearly articulated time and again: to produce a Jewish homeland at the 
expense of an indigenous population; to keep Arab and Jew completely 
separate, allowing little—if any—space for mingling. Abba Eban has 
stated this most clearly: “We do not want Israelis to become Arab. We 
are duty bound to fight against the spirit of the Levant, which corrupts 
individuals and societies.”39
*****
Although early Zionists are well known for having depicted Palestine 
as “a land without a people for a people without a land,” it is evident 
that upon their initial visits, Zionists recognized conversely that the 
land was, in fact, well populated. However, they did not like what they 
found: significant numbers of Arab and “Oriental” Jews who had lived 
there for many centuries. Indeed, with the exception of one century 
during the Crusades, Jerusalem had been fully integrated into the Arab 
Muslim world since the 7th century. Its Jewish communities illustrated 
this fact well. During the 1,300 years of Muslim rule over Jerusalem, 
Muslims had comprised the majority of its population, while Jews had 
traditionally remained a small but significant minority. In 1800, about a 
century before Zionism became an active force in Palestine, the Jewish 
population of Jerusalem was estimated to be about 2,000. Alexander 
Scholch, a scholar of Middle East studies, indicates that the Jewish 
presence in the city only began to significantly rise under the heavy 
pressure of the Zionist movement, which by 1880 had successfully 
increased the Jewish population to 17,000. By 1922 it had doubled that 
number to 34,400.40
In fact, the highly influential Israeli, Zangwill, who invented the 
slogan “a land without a people for a people without a land,” soon 
discovered, upon visiting Jerusalem in 1905, “that Palestine proper had 
already its inhabitants. The province of Jerusalem is already twice as 
thickly populated as the United States, having fifty-two souls to the 
square mile, and not 25 per cent of them Jews.”41 Based on such unex-
pected observations, Zangwill summed up: “[We] must be prepared 
either to drive out by the sword the [Arab] tribes in possession as our 
forefathers did or to grapple with the problem of a large alien popula-
tion, mostly Mohammedan and accustomed for centuries to despise 
us.”42
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The situation was further complicated by the fact that many of the 
Jews—who had long been living in Palestine and had become part of 
its Arab social fabric—were not initially attracted to Zionism.43 Despite 
limited numbers, Jews were well represented in the everyday life of 
Jerusalem and formed part of the city’s mosaic. Many of the old Sep-
hardic quarters, such as Nahlaot, built by Jews from Yemen and Kurd-
istan, or the Moroccan Jewish Boukhara district, “still resemble the 
Moroccan Mellahs or the Jewish quarter of Damascus”:
Givat Mordechai was a village of young religious couples who lived in 
modest homes with red tile roofs surrounded by orchards. In Machane 
Yehuda, the Pinto, Gabai and Eliashar—those who are called “native 
Sephardim”—were a true local aristocracy before the seizure of the com-
munity by the Zionists. They still spoke Ladino in the cafes where they 
played backgammon while drinking arak to the sound of songs by Farid 
el-Astrashe.44
Upon witnessing the existence of such Arab Jews, an utterly alien 
reality to them, Zionists, who had already begun to characterize the 
Arab world using racial terminology, did not even consider forming 
strong relationships with the existing Jewish population.45 They had 
already begun to envision a modern, European-inspired Jewish state.
In fact, many of the early Zionists, such as Theodor Herzl, Chaim 
Weizmann, Vladmir Jabotinsky, and David Ben-Gurion, all shared little 
respect for the Old City as it stood. Herzl, quite secular in his outlook, 
never having circumcised his only son, looked to Haifa, with its access 
to Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, rather than Jerusalem, which he 
felt, “was redolent with fanaticism and superstition, the musty deposit 
of ‘two thousand years of inhumanity and intolerance… . The amiable 
dreamer of Nazareth has only contributed to increasing the hatred.’ ”46 
In his futurist novel, Old New Land, Herzl carries this theme in a more 
racist direction: two Germans, a Jew and a Christian, visit Palestine 
before and after the establishment of the state of Israel, witnessing how 
the Zionist movement has effectively exchanged the oriental impuri-
ties of the past for the more modern and Europeanized society the new 
Israel has become.47
Herzl’s racist discourse toward Palestinian Arabs and Oriental-Jews 
was quite typical of the Zionist movement. Early Zionists were heavily 
influenced by European anti-Semitic ideas, and they believed them-
selves to be on a mission to remake the Jew as a modern, European-like 
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subject. The old Jewish communities of Jerusalem represented what 
these new Zionist settlers wanted to negate. As a result, Zionists would 
aggressively denounce these Arab Jews as “parasitical”: “He was to be 
replaced by a ‘new Jew’ who would achieve the settlement of Palestine 
by means of productive agricultural work.”48
Many of the early settlers consciously stayed away from Jerusalem.49 
A good number of them worked and lived in the emerging and com-
pletely new Tel Aviv, which quickly became the center of the move-
ment. Tel Aviv was a “modern” and “Western” city, which settlers 
preferred to other urban centers that many perceived as infested with 
oriental-like inhabitants. While they loved the modernity of Tel Aviv, 
they equally despised Jerusalem: “With its synagogues, ghetto-like 
neighborhoods and its Oriental market, its Jews in kaftans and fur hats, 
it reminded them too much of the Diaspora they hated.”50 Such imag-
ery represented a world to the European settlers that seemed to belong 
to earlier times. Further, the city, having been under Arab/Muslim rule 
for many centuries, was profoundly marked by its centrality to Arab 
and Muslim civilization. Its more mundane Arab characteristics, such 
as its cafés and “their nargilah pipes, gramophones and parrots,”51 
seemed to epitomize everything they wanted to negate in creating a 
new Jewish state. Such sentiments extended to other Arab cities, such 
as Jaffa, for example, which “was not the right place ‘for new people 
with new thoughts to live in.’ ”52
Conversely, by such measures, Tel Aviv, built by “modern” Jews and 
completely new to the 20th century, was not tainted by a long history 
of Arab/Muslim influences. It represented the most recent and modern 
urban planning ever to enter the Orient, becoming a city where one 
“might easily imagine himself in some Italian port.”53 Indeed, even the 
name, Tel Aviv, says much about this desire to overcome the Orient, 
as it symbolizes the birth of the new out of the old, much in the same 
way that Herzl envisioned in his Old New Land: “ ‘Tel’ is an excavated 
mound, and so signifies the remains of old settlements, while ‘aviv’ 
means the first shoot of the new wheat harvest, and also springtime, 
the sign of a new beginning.”54 In this spirit, the establishment of Tel 
Aviv provided the newcomers with a space that could represent the 
new Israel as the first exclusively Jewish city to have been established 
for countless generations, while containing and articulating their con-
temporary brand of Jewishness.55 James Morris, one of Tel Aviv’s earli-
est settlers, expresses this sentiment succinctly: “I do not feel altogether 
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abroad in Tel Aviv… . If you feel yourself to be a Western man, you 
will always be half at home in this…city.”56
*****
The Zionist dichotomy between a modern Jewish Tel Aviv and a hope-
lessly oriental Jerusalem would soon change form, as the movement, 
gaining acceptance by colonial powers, found new avenues through 
which to unleash its nationalist project upon Jerusalem. With the cre-
ation of the state of Israel in 1948, Zionists would attempt to eradicate 
Jerusalem’s unique Muslim, Jewish, and Christian mosaic. As the new 
state was accorded international legitimacy, it immediately embarked 
upon a policy to consolidate settlements throughout West Jerusalem. 
It pursued aggressive claims upon many of the Palestinian neighbor-
hoods that had been temporarily abandoned by Arabs who hoped to 
return after the conflict subsided. Taking advantage of the mass evacu-
ation, Israel moved quickly toward a Judaization of Jerusalem, trans-
forming it in such a way as to make it Jewish politically, nationally, and 
“racially.”
Many of West Jerusalem’s once Arab villages, such as Deir Yasin, al-
Maliha, Lifta, and Ein Kirma, were quickly annexed to the new state. 
Ninety percent of these village populations had been Arab,57 but upon 
their departure after the 1948 war, Israel immediately confiscated their 
homes, granting the most lavish ones to the generals of the Israeli 
army, and eventually demolishing those that were less appealing in 
order to create space to house the incoming Jewish settlers. Today all 
of these villages have been Judaized and are now occupied by many 
of Israel’s ministries, including the Knesset and the prime minister’s 
office.58 This territory includes Deir Yasin, a village that was once the 
home of Palestinian women and children who were gunned down 
by Menachem Begin’s Irgun, and is now used as a Jewish industrial 
zone.59 Of the Palestinians that have remained in Jerusalem, many 
continue to be denied building permits, and if they leave the country 
for longer than 12 months, they would find themselves branded with 
the status of refugee and not permitted to return, with “their resident 
permits arbitrarily canceled.”60
The Judaization of Jerusalem escalated further with the 1967 war, 
when Israel expanded to include all of traditional Palestine, including 
East Jerusalem, which was overwhelmingly Palestinian. Israel’s victory 
further stimulated Jewish nationalism, giving many Israeli Jews an 
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enhanced sense of triumph.61 With renewed confidence, Israel used its 
victory to integrate more Palestinian territory into the state of Israel, 
even though such action was contrary to international law. This was 
especially the case in East Jerusalem, where Israel quickly extended its 
boundaries by annexing numbers of Arab communities and territories 
into Israel proper.62 As in its 1948 treatment of West Jerusalem, Israel 
would follow the same policy in 1967, attempting to make East Jerusa-
lem “Jewish physically, ethnically, and politically.”63 Toward that end, 
it strategically enlarged the city through land seizures, while mini-
mizing the Palestinian presence in the new zones.64 Although Israel 
claimed to guarantee the right of Palestinians to access Jerusalem, to 
this day many Palestinian Muslim and Christian refugees from 1967 
have found that this is not the case. The Israeli occupation authori-
ties imposed a permit-only policy upon Palestinians living within the 
Occupied Territories, thus criminalizing those who enter the city with-
out permit in hand.65
When Israel occupied Jerusalem entirely in 1967, it planted 200,000 
Jewish settlers in East Jerusalem with the objective of consolidating its 
hold over the city and making it very difficult for Palestinians to claim 
any portion of it in future negotiations.66 Moreover, it dismantled an 
entire Muslim quarter near the Wailing Wall, expelling all of its inhab-
itants without compensation and demolishing their houses in order 
to build an extensive plaza.67 Today the plaza has been turned into a 
nationalist site where Israelis, just below the sacred Muslim site, hold 
nationalist rallies and swear in army recruits.68
*****
After the 1967 occupation of Jerusalem, Israeli policy for its eastern 
sector aimed explicitly to “create facts on the ground” by enlarging the 
Jewish population demographically, while restricting Arab resettle-
ment from the West Bank.69 This dual character of Israeli occupation 
engendered a “process of dispossession, displacement, dismember-
ment, disenfranchisement and dispersal” of East Jerusalem’s Palestin-
ian population.70 Further exacerbating tensions, many Orthodox Jewish 
families were encouraged to move into largely Arab neighborhoods in 
the congested Muslim Quarter of the Old City. As some social scien-
tists have suggested, these settlements had little interest in creating 
diverse neighborhoods where Arabs and Jews would live together. 
On the contrary, the objective behind such strategy was based on “a 
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religious-nationalist ideology,”71 consistent with the tenets of Zionist 
discourse: to Judaize Jerusalem by implanting “ethnically pure” Jew-
ish settlements.
Moreover, the Israeli authorities made it very difficult for the reverse 
to occur. To this day, very few Arabs have been allowed to move into 
West Jerusalem, including those who continue to hold the keys to their 
former homes, hoping to return to the now largely Jewish sector of the 
city. Similarly, no known cases exist in East Jerusalem of Arabs being 
permitted to settle within recently established Jewish neighborhoods.72 
In one example, Arab families seeking to reside in a Jewish neighbor-
hood were met with strong opposition and “were forced to leave their 
homes in order to permit the reestablishment of a totally homogeneous 
Jewish residential zone.”73
This policy has aimed to make it as difficult as possible for future 
generations to propose a shared Jerusalem in which Palestinians and 
Jews alike can claim the city as their capital. Clearly stated in 1981 
by Beni Ricardo, an activist of the Jewish fundamentalist movement 
Gush Enumim, the intention of Israeli policy in East Jerusalem is “to 
change the idea of dividing the city into something that is utterly ridic-
ulous, as is the idea of returning the Arabs to Cordoba or Andalusia 
today—ridiculous.”74 Ricardo understood this strategy as “one way to 
prevent the separation of Israel from expanded East Jerusalem.”75 Such 
nationalist assaults on East Jerusalem have created the political context 
in which Palestinians, nearly 30% of the city’s population today, are 
largely treated as a “demographic” hazard threatening the city’s Jew-
ish majority.76
In their efforts to create racial segregation, Israeli officials have 
instituted differential access to public resources and services, favor-
ing Jerusalem’s Jewish population far more than its Arab inhabitants.77 
Although activist Jews and Palestinians have repeatedly warned of the 
implicit dangers surrounding such discrimination, Israel continues to 
spend dramatically less on the education, health, housing, and other 
social services of Palestinian Arabs than it does for its Jewish inhabit-
ants.78 As Amos Elon elucidates:
It was not a “mosaic,” as [the former mayor of Jerusalem] Kollek often 
called it; mosaics have a certain harmony of design; here the division 
reflected only discrimination and a deepening chasm. There was an 
enormous disparity between the public funds allocated respectively to 
the Israeli and Palestinian quarters.79
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The policies stemming from the events of 1967 not only represent 
an administrative occupation of Jerusalem, but a linguistic Judaization 
as well. As Daphna Golan-Agnon has recently argued, Jerusalem is “a 
city closed to almost all Palestinians, a city where the municipal park-
ing lot has no signs in Arabic, the language spoken by 30 percent of its 
inhabitants,” producing in effect an apartheid-like situation compara-
ble to that of South Africa, in which “the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem 
live as foreigners in their own city.”80 Further, the most psychologically 
damaging aspect of Israeli policy is its attempt to obliterate any traces 
of Palestinian village life, as Israelis continue to be inundated with 
a historical revisionism that ignores the Palestinian cultural heritage 
and demographic presence in recent times, as well as its subsequent 
deportation upon the establishment of Israel’s statehood.81 This objec-
tive has been accomplished so thoroughly that today many Israelis are 
unaware of the fact that the streets they walk, the kibbutzim they visit, 
and the art communes they enjoy were quite recently inhabited by 
Arab Muslim and Arab Christian families. Despite a continued Pales-
tinian presence, all traces of the families that were expelled in 1948 and 
again in 1967 have been removed or forgotten.82 Precious little recog-
nition is left of the historical existence of the many men, women, and 
children who once shared the same land, having anchored their roots 
and heritage to it.83
As Edward Said explains, such Zionist objectives have aimed to 
deny:
the existence of the Palestinian people, and by dehumanizing them, 
Zionists meant to hide from the world the intended victims of their 
colonization. They paraded before world public opinion as the national 
liberation movement of the Jewish people, but they could not do so if the 
fact were known that they were destroying an indigenous Asian com-
munity struggling to be free.84
Said further characterizes popular Israeli sentiment as one in which 
“the Arabs are a nuisance and their presence is a fly in the ointment.”85 
In Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Hertzlia, for example, Israeli Jews are oblivious 
to the existence of Arabs. Such Israeli cities are segregated, while Jew-
ish settlements in East Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories have 
their own road system, guarded by checkpoints and armored Israeli 
troops:
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They’re protected from them, just as whites were protected from blacks 
during apartheid…because the roads went around in such a way as to 
avoid the sight, in that case, of blacks.86
Israeli Jews thus rarely have had contact with Palestinians, who 
remain distant, visible to them only through ideologically mediated 
depictions of suicide bombers or of Palestinians chanting “Death to 
Israel.” Consequently, they remain insulated and largely incapable of 
witnessing the effect that their government has had on Palestinians. As 
Meron Benvenisti, the former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, remarks:
I recall the first time I felt the tragedy of the Palestinians penetrate my 
Zionist shield… . I remembered the place from a trip with my father, 
and the desolation—the empty houses still standing, the ghost of a vil-
lage once bustling with life—stunned me. I sat with my back against an 
old water trough and wondered where the villagers were and what they 
were feeling.87
As a young man in 1948, Meron Benvenisti witnessed firsthand 
how the existence of the new state affected the indigenous inhabit-
ants of Palestine. Suddenly, he recalls in his writing, a Muslim family 
disappeared on Gaza Road; the memory of Palestinians from the vil-
lage of Deir Yasin was “paraded through the main streets of Jewish 
Jerusalem by their [Zionist] captors;” abandoned Arab neighborhoods 
were looted and kibbutzniks, upon seizing the land, “harvest[ed] the 
ripe barley left by the Arab farmers of Hittin in the lower Galilee.”88 
Upon such difficult reflection, he asks himself: “Have we transformed 
a struggle for survival into an ethnic cleansing operation, sending peo-
ple into exile because we wanted to plunder their land?”89
Such dissonance of personal and cultural memory is the direct result 
of an Israeli nationalist policy designed to silence the Palestinian expe-
rience while simultaneously promoting a Jewish historical narrative. 
One example of how this has been accomplished is in the development 
of archaeological excavations following the capture of Jerusalem’s Old 
City in 1967, with the attempt to promote the legitimacy of a Jew-
ish nation’s “return” to its original homeland.90 These digs naturally 
emphasized the era of the Israelite Temples that represented an ancient 
Jewish national claim, not the city’s many centuries of Muslim his-
tory.91 In this manner, Israel pursued a narrative promoting its revival 
as an original community that has always been linked with the land of 
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Palestine.92 Abu el-Hajj articulates this clearly, asserting that such his-
torical accounts were:
used to bolster the nationalist mythology of ancient destruction righted 
by modern rebirth… . These excavators sought and produced what they 
regarded as evidence of national ascendance and prosperity in antiquity, 
in relation to which the legitimacy of Israeli control over the Old City in 
the present would be fashioned.93
The significance of this strategy to accentuate a biblical past at the 
expense of the more recent Islamic period should not be underes-
timated. As historian Michel-Rolph Trouillot argues in his Silencing 
the Past, the production of a historical narrative between competing 
groups is always biased toward the groups that have greater access 
to the means of such production. The consequences of this power, 
although not as visible as gunfire or political crusades, are equally as 
effective.94 Even today, the overwhelming majority of research digs are 
those perceived to be of national significance to the state of Israel,95 
despite the fact that such efforts only represent a window into one 
chapter of the great Palestine saga.96 Bulldozers are regularly used in 
Israel to dig through many layers, casting aside or perhaps destroying 
significant Christian and Islamic archaeological treasures in favor of 
the Iron Age, as they search particularly for remnants of the First and 
Second Temples that are recognized as important “national” artifacts.
As I have visited the museum of Jerusalem over these past few years, 
I am always stunned to discover how small its showcase of the Islamic 
period is in comparison to the Jewish exhibits. Trouillot succinctly cap-
tures the sentiments I felt at the time: “[a]t best, history is a story about 
power, a story about those who won.”97 While archaeologists continue 
to gain funding, prestige, and media coverage as they focus “on eras of 
‘national ascendance’ and ‘glory’ in the ancient or medieval pasts,” the 
historical memory of Islamic and Palestinian history will continue to 
be marginalized and silenced.98
Indeed, nationalist manipulation or production of historical mem-
ory is not only intended for the victors, but also functions to remind 
those on the other side of the fence that they have forever lost. As Mou-
rid Bargouti once remarked, upon reaching a checkpoint in Palestine:
My eyes stopped at a poster of Massada. Their myth recounts that they 
had held fast in the fortress of Massada until they were all killed—but 
they did not surrender. Is this their message to us, they hang it on the 
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gate to remind us that they will stay here forever? Was this a deliberate 
choice, or just a poster?99
The persistence of such narratives have yielded an almost common-
sensical Israeli discourse regarding Jerusalem as the eternal capital of 
the Jews, as evidenced in a remark that Yitzak Rabin made during a 
speech to the Knessett in 1993: “Jerusalem will not be open to negotia-
tion. It has been and will forever be the capital of the Jewish people, 
under Israeli sovereignty, a focus of dreams and longings of every 
Jew.”100 Many other Israeli officials have gone on record negating Pal-
estinian, Muslim, and Christian claims to Jerusalem, while stating that 
the city was and will eternally continue to be the Jewish capital. Teddy 
Kollek, the mayor of Jerusalem for 28 years until 1993, arrogantly dis-
torted history when he commented to former President Clinton that the 
Jewish claim to Jerusalem is much more authentic than any other: “In 
another few years we in Jerusalem will celebrate 3,000 years since the 
construction of the city by King David, whereas the Palestinian claim 
is less than one generation old.”101 Similarly, Ehud Olmert recently 
remarked, “that there was no Arab Jerusalem. There was only a ‘Jewish 
Jerusalem,’ ” only to be outdone by Ariel Sharon who insisted that Jeru-
salem is “Israel’s Capital, united for all eternity.”102 Arthur Hertzberg 
sums up well the exclusionary nature of Zionist discourse regarding 
the city: “In the mind of [Zionists], Jerusalem had been fashioned by 
long history as the Jewish capital. Jerusalem could no more be taken 
away from the Jews than Rome could be kept from the Italians.”103
In summation, what was once a symbiotic city, encapsulating many 
intertwined identities, has been thoroughly shattered with the coming 
of modern nationalism, specifically as a result of the nature of British 
rule over Jerusalem and the aggressive nationalist dimension of Jew-
ish Zionism. Responding to intentions of transforming the facts on the 
ground, Palestinians have been forced into defensive postures, some-
times violent in nature, but always as a result of the dire circumstances 
in which they have found themselves.
The limits of time-immemorialist scholarship, with its focus on an 
inherent religious bias toward violence, are evident. In presenting an 
alternative to this perspective, my hope is to illuminate that much of 
what appears on the surface to be religious and ethnic in character is 
actually a product of very recent developments that are based upon 
issues of humanitarian concern: the history of Zionist settlements, the 
mass demolition of Palestinian homes, the massive creation of Pales-
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tinian refugee camps, and the production of an apartheid system of 
Bantustans under Israeli occupation. While Qur’anic passages and the 
preaching of Jihad have been used to fan flames among sectors of the 
Arab world, such developments cannot be understood as occurring 
in a vacuum, as many scholars and media sources try to do. Instead, 
they must be analyzed within the context of a massive ethnic cleans-
ing campaign that has threatened to extinguish the livelihoods that 
Palestinians have historically known in the land of Palestine. Such an 
analysis is rooted in issues of power, land, and resources, as opposed 
to a religious fanaticism that is designed to demonize Palestinians and 
Arab Muslims in general. The notion that Muslims and Arabs, owing 
to their traditional and religious beliefs, are inherently violent toward 
Jews does not hold weight in light of a historical analysis that takes into 
account the cataclysmic effect that colonial rule, coupled with Zionist 
ideology, has had on the Palestinian people. Indeed, as I hope to have 
illustrated, this lengthy conflict has been far from religious in nature. 
Instead, it has been the direct product of two nationalist movements 
seeking the same real estate: one has amassed the power to dislocate 
an indigenous people, while the other has been formed out of a forced 
sense of desperation.
*****
The nation-state essentially produces a “purified” notion of a people 
encapsulated within a territorial space of its own. We must find a 
new discourse that not only tolerates the Other, but in fact disarms 
the assumption of power that produces peoplehood in the first place. 
Nationalism as well as any other concept of “the people”—be it Jewish, 
Arab, American, French, or any other—will constantly shift its internal 
borders and find new binaries to reproduce its Self. Nationalism posits 
that humanity is composed of a number of cultures, with each having a 
singular essence. It reifies the nation in the most rigid way, by making 
it into a thing and, in the process, naturalizing it. It produces an identity 
that inspires a sense of naturally belonging to “a territory embedded 
with cultural meanings, a shared history, and a linguistic community,” 
and it continuously produces an ideological structure that creates and 
reproduces “the purity of the people” at the expense of those Others 
on the outside, working like “a machine that produces Others, creates 
racial difference, and raises boundaries that delimit and support the 
modern subject of sovereignty.”104 The Arab, the Muslim, and the Pal-
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estinian as a unified identity produces its own Other in response to the 
Israeli Jew, negating the external identity in the perceived need for its 
very own state. The Jewish state is produced in the same fashion, but 
its power can render the Arab invisible, at times in a crude and brutal 
fashion. The identity of the nation rests heavily on the fixity of the con-
structed border, not only on the negation of the Other. In this sense, the 
Jewish or Arab Self needs the continuous clash and confrontation with 
its Other in order for it to maintain its power, a process understood 
by both Zionist and Jihadist groups, who literally need each other for 
their own reproduction.
By understanding that nationalism invents nations where they do 
not exist, it is possible to understand that the collective “we” unit is a 
product of the nation-state itself, and not something naturally preced-
ing it.105 A nationalist identity is a reductionist and one-dimensional 
reality, in which we “define ourselves solely in relation to a flag, as 
belonging to a unique identity, and thus divide the world between 
an ethnic or national ‘us’ and all others.”106 In the case of the “Israeli” 
and the “Palestinian,” reduced to a simplistic bi-national classifica-
tion scheme, the quest for security and basic rights has instead cre-
ated a century of deep trauma. The notion of finding some measure 
of mutual affirmation through a two-state settlement, although seem-
ingly a reasonable solution to the degree of antagonism and violence 
that each group experiences, nonetheless remains problematic as it 
fails to confront the naturalized ontology of Self and Other implicit in 
the national schema. Such a project connotes a consolidated Self that, 
while it affirms the existence of the Other, nonetheless accepts those 
very same binaries present in more chauvinistic nationalist projects. In 
this sense, affirming the Other, while admittedly better than the pres-
ent status quo, leaves the Jew and the Arab with no common ground 
and does not address or resolve the deep complexity of the multitude’s 
identity.
An example of this complexity can be found in the figure of Ella 
Shohat, for whom this either/or reduction is especially problematic, 
as she is a Mizrahi Jew born in Israel, whose Jewish-Arab parents 
migrated from Baghdad. As a Jew who identifies as both Jewish and 
Arab, it becomes literally impossible “to hide our Middle Easterness 
under one Jewish ‘we.’ ” In her words:
Our history simply cannot be discussed in European Jewish terminology. 
As Iraqi Jews, while retaining a communal identity, we were generally 
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well integrated and indigenous to the country, forming an inseparable 
part of its social and cultural life. Thoroughly Arabized, we used Arabic 
even in hymns and religious ceremonies… . Prominent Jewish writers, 
poets and scholars played a vital role in Arab culture, distinguishing 
themselves in Arabic-speaking theater, in music, as singers, composers, 
and players of traditional instruments.107
Shohat’s identity is more complicated than nationalist categories 
permit, yet Shohat herself, even after taking into account her serious 
charges against present Israeli nationalist classifications, reaffirms and 
reclaims those very same classifications by positing an “Arab” past, 
thus continuing to naturalize the notion of peoplehood. The limits of 
this can best be evaluated in the work of less radical, liberal Jews like 
Ahad Ha’am and Martin Buber. Ha’am, for example, a highly spiri-
tual and tolerant Jew who, although utterly committed to the Zionist 
nationalist cause, is nonetheless highly critical of the self-righteous 
wing of the Zionist movement, engages in an honest and critical assess-
ment of their policies to uproot the Palestinians. In prophetic fashion, 
he warns that their efforts to restore Israel through the trampling of 
Palestinian Arabs have not only obscured the humanity of the Other, 
but may have irretrievably damaged the moral consciousness of the 
Jewish movement:
We must surely learn, from both our past and present history, how careful 
we must be not to provoke the anger of the native people by doing them 
wrong, how we should be cautious in our dealings with a foreign people 
among whom we returned to live, to handle these people with love and 
respect and, needless to say, with justice and good judgment. And what 
do our brothers do? Exactly the opposite!…This…has planted despotic 
tendencies in their hearts… . They deal with the Arabs with hostility and 
cruelty, trespass unjustly, beat them shamefully for no sufficient reason, 
and even boast about their actions. There is no one to stop the flood and 
put an end to this despicable and dangerous tendency… . Even if [the 
Arabs] are silent and endlessly reserved, they keep their anger in their 
hearts. And these people will be revengeful like no other… . [But as long 
as things continue the way they are,] the society that I envision, if my 
dream is not just a false notion, this society will have to begin to create 
itself in the midst of fuss, noisiness and panic, and will have to face the 
prospects of both internal and external war.108
Given the current circumstances, Ha’am’s words some seven decades 
past is reassuring. Similarly, Buber’s deep and just desire to teach other 
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Zionists the skill of putting themselves “in the place of the other indi-
vidual, the stranger, and to make his soul ours”109 is highly inspiring. 
Yet, for both Ha’am and Buber, the Jew and Arab remain two self-con-
tained peoples in search of dignity. While they are able to make the 
stranger’s suffering visible to the Jew, the Arab remains exterior to his 
Jewish identity.
The discourse of “two peoples” needing to respect and tolerate each 
other’s existence remains within the nationalist paradigm, in which 
Israeli and Palestinian continue to be naturalized and thus fundamen-
tally irreconcilable. The Jew and Arab still stand as two separate peo-
ple, each with its own heritage, traditions, and language, that function 
in the same way that museums “ornamentalize” difference. Indeed, as 
Ammiel Alcalay has recently argued:
The very assumption that Arabic [Muslim and Jewish] cultures are so 
distant they must somehow be bridged—even by scholars trying to 
prove connections—is itself an entirely ideological construct that would 
have made little sense to a twelfth-century Parisian, a seventeenth-cen-
tury Venetian, or even an early-twentieth-century Syrian.110
*****
The particularistic model of national identity, even when interpreted 
liberally and with good will toward the Other, cannot go beyond a rei-
fied construct of reality, in which insider and outsider are each under-
stood as having a singular will to act culturally, politically, creatively, 
destructively. In this model, certain kinds of behaviors and customs 
can always be attributed to a group in taxonomical form. Such univer-
salistic projects as Christianity and Islam have attempted to provide 
an alternative model that idealizes the dissolution of divisions that 
are based on particularistic structures, but have fallen short in that 
they have failed to escape a binary understanding of the social world. 
However, perhaps the monotheistic religions—Judaism included, as 
it espouses, for example, a notion of welcoming the stranger as one 
would welcome a cherished guest—have planted the seeds of a plu-
ralistic multiplicity in which Self and Other cease to exist in binary or 
dialectical fashion, but exist instead in constant dialogue. Perhaps it is 
possible to envision the formation of open social relations that have 
historically been so thoroughly constitutive one of the other that to 
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think of them as two interacting peoples with utterly different sets of 
identity would be a contradiction in terms.
A good example of this can be found in the writings of the famous 
Palestinian poet, Mahmud Darwish, who constantly complicates 
nationalist categories:
There will be a time when the Jew will not be ashamed to find the Arab 
part inside of himself, and the Arab will not be ashamed to declare that 
he is constituted also by Jewish elements. Especially when talking about 
Eretz Yisrael in Hebrew and Falestin in Arabic. I am a product of all the 
cultures that have passed through this land—Greek, Roman, Persian, 
Jewish, and Ottoman. A presence that exists even in my language. Each 
culture fortified itself, passed on, and left something. I am a son to all 
those fathers, but I belong to one mother. Does that mean my mother 
is a whore? My mother is this land that absorbed us all, was a witness 
and was a victim. I am also born of the Jewish culture that was in Pales-
tine.111
What is most inspiring about Darwish’s intervention is that he 
directly and unequivocally challenges the binary logic of nationalism 
and provides a clear example for those who are struggling to produce 
a new ontology of Self and Other that undermines the nationalist nar-
rative. The affirmation of the Other inside the Self as a means of con-
testing the notion of peoplehood is extremely important to such an 
aim, because it provides the hope of a break with the classic view of 
the nation.
A more contemporary figure is the Jewish American, Daniel Boya-
rin, who has written extensively on the question of identity and is 
himself in search of an alternative to the binaries that nationalism and 
other institutional forms of power force on us. Although he is not a 
scholar of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, his scattered comments are 
highly suggestive. In a forward to his recent book, Border Lines, he 
reflects on this very issue:
As I write, in occupied Palestine literal physical boundaries of barbed 
wired and electrified fencing are being raised to separate violently one 
“people” from another. In the process of maintaining our own identi-
ties…can we learn the lessons of the past and prevent ourselves at the 
eleventh hour from the path of new and even more violent heresiolo-
gies? Jews and Christians are called upon at this moment to learn from 
our own difficult histories, without in any way rendering those histories 
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equivalent phenomenologically or morally, and do something different 
now. The prophet teaches: Zion will be redeemed only though justice.112
Darwish and Boyarin, each in his own unique way, share the notion 
that what appears at first distant and strange becomes very close when 
understood in terms of dialogue—so close indeed that the Other can be 
felt inside the Self. Thus, rather than describing cultures capable only 
of superficial interaction through some externalized scheme of con-
tact, both of these writers attempt to blur the division by positing the 
Other as intimate to the Self. Their examples not only blur the division 
between two identities in struggle, but also render those very bound-
aries, with all their notions of purity, difficult—if not impossible—to 
police.
How does Jerusalem fit into this project of blurring Self and Other? 
Where nationalism posits the Self as an enclosed, bound cultural space, 
premised on maintaining a border to differentiate its Self from an exter-
nal Other, Jerusalem serves as a powerful symbol for those interested 
in re-ontologizing notions of both Arab and Jew. It is a symbolic sacred 
space that provides the ultimate site in which to negate and remove the 
antinomies themselves. An unbound terrain can integrate its diversity 
into networks across open space, rendering indecipherable old dual-
isms, divisions, negations, and borders of the modern state. In such a 
vision, the al-Aqsa Mosque, the Wailing Wall, and the Holy Sepulcher 
can stand as symbols not of purified sacred spaces, but of intertwined 
identities.
Moreover, adopting the usurpation of the Other into the Self makes 
it difficult for the state not only to police difference, but to actually 
reproduce and fashion further nationalist projects. As understood from 
this perspective, Jerusalem’s intricate system of sacred space is so inter-
twined that it becomes impossible for a state to appropriate the city for 
itself, as the insider/outsider model is torn asunder and replaced by 
that of hybridism.
Those who occupy privileged positions regarding the construction 
of meaning (namely, the archaeologists, poets, historians, sociologists, 
art historians, Middle Eastern and Islamic scholars, etc.) form a power-
ful social force armed with the skill to denaturalize peoplehood. Rather 
than operating from the perspective of a national binary system, as has 
most often been the case until recently, we must offer an alternative 
that takes seriously the notion of “fuzzy” spaces. Thus, in our efforts 
to negate a typical modern atlas, with its clear lines dividing up the 
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nations of the world, we must offer paintings of the world composed 
as “diverse points of colors such that no clear pattern can be discerned 
in any detail.”113
Jerusalem, as a sacred space, must be transformed by the artist, 
the writer, the priest, the Mufti, the Sheikh, the Ulama, and the Rabbi 
to become a place at once unified and diffused in such a way that it 
is impossible to distinguish inside from outside. We must all shed as 
dead skin the model of straight lines and binaries and recognize the 
fuzzy space of symbioses and complexities. We must not only revise 
our modern nationalized constructs of the Other, but engage with full 
and open heart in the production of art and historical and sociological 
analyses that fracture the Self and Other to the point where the Other 
can no longer be bound and made to stand distinct from the Self. In 
this way, Jerusalem is a grand symbol for all who are interested in 
a new ontology. It can become an authentically global sacred city, a 
genuinely universalistic symbol that safely allows the multitude to 
mutate their imagined bodies, their sacred spaces, their nations, their 
religions, their trade relations, their al-Aqsa Mosque, their Wailing 
Wall, into true visions of universal unity. •
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